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Environmental Policy, Public Interest and Political Market

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  • Georges A. Tanguay
  • Paul Lanoie

    ()
    (IEA, HEC Montréal)

  • Jérôme Moreau
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    Abstract

    In this article, we highlight the factors which influence governments in their decision to implement environmental policies of varying degrees of severity. We substantiate our arguments with analytical evidence from public interest theory and the economic theory of regulation (“interest group theory”). We demonstrate, through empirical analysis based on the policies of the 22 most developed OECD countries, that pressure groups have sufficient impact on environmental regulation for us to be sure that economic theory outweighs public interest theory.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 01-01.

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    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0101

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    Postal: Institut d'économie appliquée HEC Montréal 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7
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    Keywords: regulation; environment; public interest; political market;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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    4. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, 1994. "Economic Growth and the Environment," NBER Working Papers 4634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    7. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December.
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    12. Hettige, Hemamala & Lucas, Robert E B & Wheeler, David, 1992. "The Toxic Intensity of Industrial Production: Global Patterns, Trends, and Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 478-81, May.
    13. Per G. Fredriksson, 1999. "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 513-535, January.
    14. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
    15. Mark Pearson, 1995. "The political economy of implementing environmental taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 357-373, August.
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    17. Revesz, Richard L. & Stavins, Robert N., 2007. "Environmental Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
    18. Fredriksson, Per G., 1998. "Environmental policy choice: Pollution abatement subsidies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-63, March.
    19. R. Damania, 1999. "Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(4), pages 415-433, June.
    20. Dion, Catherine & Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit, 1998. "Monitoring of Pollution Regulation: Do Local Conditions Matter?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 5-18, January.
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