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The Political Economy of Deregulation: The Case of Intrastate Long Distance

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  • Kaserman, David L
  • Mayo, John W
  • Pacey, Patricia L

Abstract

Observed variation in the decisions of state regulators to deregulate AT&T in the provision of intrastate interLATA telecommunications services provides useful data with which to test the economic theory of regulation against its principal alternative--the public interest theory. An empirical model of the decision to deregulate is specified and estimated. Our results lend empirical support to the economic theory of regulation and fail to support the public interest theory. The results also help to explain the lethargic pace of deregulation of this industry. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 49-63

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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:49-63

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

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Cited by:
  1. Knittel, Christopher R., 1997. "Local telephone pricing: competitive forces at work," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 87-96, June.
  2. Georges A. Tanguay & Paul Lanoie & Jérôme Moreau, 2001. "Environmental Policy, Public Interest and Political Market," Cahiers de recherche 01-01, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  3. Newbery, D., 1996. "Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Utilities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9620, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  4. Catherine Dion & Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, 1996. "Monitoring of Pollution Regulation: Do Local Conditions Matter," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-33, CIRANO.
  5. Crone, Lisa & Tschirhart, John, 1998. "Separating economic from political influences on government decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 405-425, May.
  6. Ward, Michael R., . "Rural Telecommunications Subsidies Do Not Help," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association.
  7. Dewenter, Ralf & Kruse, Jörn, 2010. "Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation," DICE Discussion Papers 10, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  8. Dion, Catherine & Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit, 1997. "Monitoring environmental standards : do local conditions matter?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1701, The World Bank.
  9. Jeffrey Macher & John Mayo, 2012. "The World of Regulatory Influence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 59-79, February.
  10. Tomaso Duso & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2001. "Towards a Political Economy of Industrial Organization: Empirical Regularities from Deregulation," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  11. Savitski, David W., 2001. "Initial state regulation of investor-owned utilities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 683-695, November.
  12. Duso, Tomaso & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2003. "Endogenous deregulation: evidence from OECD countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 67-71, October.
  13. Runtian Jing & John L. Graham, 2008. "Values Versus Regulations: How Culture Plays Its Role," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 80(4), pages 791-806, July.
  14. Paul Lanoie & Jérôme Moreau & Georges A. Tanguay, 2001. "Environmental Policy, Public Interest and Political Market," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-37, CIRANO.
  15. David Savitski, 2001. "Price Effects of Across-State Regulation of U.S. Electric Utilities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 337-350, May.

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