Competition for foreign direct investment when countries are not sure of site values
AbstractThe fiscal tug-of-war between two countries to play host to a foreign- owned firm is like a Nash game. Suppose that the countries are not sure how much the firm values the sites that they offer to it. Also suppose that the countries fashion their expectation of site value by assigning the same likelihood to each value that they deem possible. Then, if they are quite unsure about site values, they will offer small subsidies to the firm. If they are pretty sure about site values, they will offer large subsidies. Here is the intuition behind the results: When a country is unsure about the value of its site, it is also unsure that a stingy offer will drive the firm to its rival. So it may take the chance and make a stingy offer rather than a generous one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 9812001.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 08 Dec 1998
Date of revision: 23 Dec 1998
Note: Type of Document - LaTex (DVI); prepared on IBM PC compatible; to print on HP Laserjet; pages: 20; figures: none
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tax competition; foreign direct investment;
Other versions of this item:
- Kiymaz, Koray & Taylor, Leon, 2000. "Competition for foreign direct investment when countries are not sure of site values," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 53-68, February.
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
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