IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rei/ecoins/v12y2010i22p215-236.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cambios en las concesiones viales en Uruguay: un análisis basado en la teoría de subastas

Author

Listed:
  • Andrés Pereyra

    (Universidad de la República de Uruguay)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the impact on the value of future investments that would derive from the privatization of a state-owned road concessionaire, taking into account the ability of the government to handle the asymmetry of information vis à vis the concessionaire. A model based on auction theory is developed in order to quantify the expected impact on government from the privatization of the concessionaire assuming the concession contract is not modified. We conclude that if the government decides to privatize the concessionaire, significant changes are required in the concession contract, especially in the absence of institutional transformations that would improve the government supervisory and control capability.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Pereyra, 2010. "Cambios en las concesiones viales en Uruguay: un análisis basado en la teoría de subastas," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 12(22), pages 215-236, January-J.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:12:y:2010:i:22:p:215-236
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/apereyra22.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15024, December.
    3. Andrés Pereyra, 2004. "Concesiones por mayor valor presente de los egresos. El caso de la Megaconcesión en Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1104, Department of Economics - dECON.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonio Estache & Jose-Luis Guasch & Atsushi Iimi & Lourdes Trujillo, 2009. "Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 41-71, September.
    2. Kang, Chao-Chung & Lee, Tsun-Siou & Huang, Szu-Chi, 2013. "Royalty bargaining in Public–Private Partnership projects: Insights from a theoretic three-stage game auction model," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-14.
    3. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    4. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Competition of E-Commerce Intermediaries," Working Papers 675, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    5. Miettinen, Paavo, 2017. "Information acquisition during a descending price auction with asymmetrically informed players," Research Discussion Papers 5/2017, Bank of Finland.
    6. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
    7. Rui Cunha Marques & Álvaro Fonseca, 2010. "Market structure, privatisation and regulation of Portuguese seaports," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 145-161, March.
    8. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
    9. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Post-Print hal-01021718, HAL.
    10. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On second-price auctions and imperfect competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.
    12. Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2015. "Financing bidders in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 534-557.
    13. Eshien Chong & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2014. "Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence," Post-Print hal-00512813, HAL.
    14. Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
    15. Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
    16. N.F. Cruz & R.C. Marques & A. Marra & C. Pozzi, 2014. "Local Mixed Companies: The Theory And Practice In An International Perspective," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 85(1), pages 1-9, March.
    17. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017. "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers 1712, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    18. Florencia Gabrielli, 2014. "Econometrics of First Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 60, pages 77-118, January-D.
    19. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortaçsu, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
    20. Sumit Joshi & Yu-An Sun & Poorvi L. Vora, 2011. "Price Discrimination And Privacy: A Note," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(01), pages 83-92.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    road concessions; auction theory;

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:12:y:2010:i:22:p:215-236. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paola Rodríguez (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feextco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.