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The Castle on the Hill

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Author Info
David Levine (UCLA)

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Abstract

A simple example of a stochastic games with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of discount factors, including those close to me, equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium for large discount factors is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium for low discount factors. A unique cyclic equilibrium is also possible for intermediate ranges of discount factors. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.2000.0094
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 330-337
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:330-337

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dutta, P.K., 1991. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 293, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Dutta Prajit K., 1995. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-80, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 633, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Dutta, P.K., 1991. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1991_66, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  9. E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg, 1984. "The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information," Working papers 310, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David K Levine & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2127, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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