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Towards a sovereign bankruptcy procedure and greater restraint in IMF crisis lending. An interim assessmen

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  • Curzio Giannini

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    (Banca d'Italia, Ufficio Relazioni Internazionali, Roma (Italy))

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    Abstract

    The paper reviews the area of the international financial architecture relating tosovereign crisis resolution. It is argued that shifting part of the burden of crisisresolution onto creditors may encourage debtor countries to take early action to counter an unsustainable debt path. Collective action clauses, the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and ceilings on IMF loans, are all necessary components of a new and better crisis resolution framework.

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9894/9776
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal BNL Quarterly Review.

    Volume (Year): 56 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 225 ()
    Pages: 83-112

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    Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:2003:21

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    Related research

    Keywords: Debt; IMF; Lending;

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    1. Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?," NBER Working Papers 9493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Xavier Freixas & Curzio Giannini & Glenn Hoggarth & Farouk Soussa, 2000. "Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 63-84, October.
    3. Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1990. "The Interwar Debt Crisis and Its Aftermath," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 69-94, January.
    4. Marcus H. Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999. "Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for A Payments Standstill," Working Paper Series WP99-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    5. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    6. Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-16.
    7. Barry Eichengreen, 1991. "Historical Research on International Lending and Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 149-169, Spring.
    8. Carlo A. Sdralevich & Biaggio Bossone, 2002. "The New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 02/4, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Dooley, Michael P., 2000. "International financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 361-377, December.
    10. Ales Bulir & Marianne Schulze-Gattas & Atish R. Ghosh & Alex Mourmouras & A. Javier Hamann & Timothy D. Lane, 2002. "IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises," IMF Occasional Papers 210, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, 2001. "The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds," Working Papers 01-20, Bank of Canada.
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