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Restructuring Sovereign Debt

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  • Barry Eichengreen

Abstract

This paper provides new empirical evidence relevant to the debate over the desirability of reforms to the way that financial markets and the international community deal with sovereign debt crises. In particular, given the ongoing opposition of investors and some sovereigns to greater use of collective action clauses (CACs) in emerging market bonds, we present new evidence on the way that financial markets have priced the use or non-use of CACs.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/089533003772034907
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 17 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 75-98

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:17:y:2003:i:4:p:75-98

Note: DOI: 10.1257/089533003772034907
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  1. Michael Mussa, 2002. "Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa67, July.
  2. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2002. "Reviving the Case for GDP-Indexed Bonds," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 02/10, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Jeffrey Sachs & Daniel Cohen, 1982. "LDC Borrowing with Default Risk," NBER Working Papers 0925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Stanley Fischer, 2002. "Financial Crises and Reform of the International Financial System," NBER Working Papers 9297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Michael P. Dooley, 2000. "Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?," NBER Working Papers 7531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 8.
  7. Sarno, Lucio & Taylor, Mark P., 1999. "Moral hazard, asset price bubbles, capital flows, and the East Asian crisis:: the first tests," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 637-657, August.
  8. Michael Mussa, 2002. "Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy," Peterson Institute Press: Policy Analyses in International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa67, November.
  9. Törbjörn I. Becker & Anthony J. Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, 2001. "Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 01/92, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
  11. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkele qt46p4z4c4, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  12. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: the Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1820, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Kenen, Peter B, 2002. "The International Financial Architecture: Old Issues and New Initiatives," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 23-45, Spring.
  14. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Kenneth Rogoff, 2002. "Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns," IMF Working Papers 02/133, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Michelle White, 2002. "Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 287-320.
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