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Une analyse économique des "signes de qualité". Labels et certification des produits

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  • Anne Perrot
  • Laurent Linnemer

Abstract

[fre] Cet article examine les stratégies de révélation de la qualité par un monopole offrant un bien de qualité inconnue. Nous examinons quatre environnements institutionnels : aucun signe de qualité n'est accessible, seule la certification est possible, seule l'adhésion à un label existe et enfin certification et label coexistent. Nous déterminons les équilibres dans chacun de ces environnements pour chaque configuration des coûts de label et de certification ainsi que du seuil de label. Le label soulève un problème de coordination entre les types possibles du monopole. De nombreuses configurations d'équilibre sont possibles, ce qui fait écho à la critique souvent adressée aux politiques de signes de qualité d'entretenir une certaine confusion dans l'esprit des consommateurs. [eng] An economic analysis of quality signals: labels and product quality certification. . This paper studies quality signalling strategies of a monopolist who offers a good of unknown quality. Four institutional environments are examined: no signal is available, only certification is available, only label is available and both certification and label are possible. For each possible values of certification and label costs, we characterize the equilibria of the signalling game. A coordination problem arises when the label exists, which could interfere with competition policy. A great number of equilibrium configurations may appear, which can be linked to a criticism that is often opposed to label and certification policies: that they may spread confusion in consumers' perception.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 51 (2000)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 1397-1418

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2000_num_51_6_410591

Note: DOI:10.2307/3503027
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco

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Cited by:
  1. R. Bentley & Michael O’Brien & Paul Ormerod, 2011. "Quality versus mere popularity: a conceptual map for understanding human behavior," Mind and Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 10(2), pages 181-191, December.
  2. Laurent Linnemer & Anne Perrot, 2007. "Conflits liés à la certification dans une relation commerciale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 15-24.
  3. Claire Chambolle & Eric Giraud-Héraud, 2003. "Certification de la qualité par une AOC : un modèle d’analyse," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 159(3), pages 83-91.

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