Private Versus Public Product Labeling
AbstractA market with asymmetric information on product quality that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard problems is considered.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 9619.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
INFORMATION; MANAGEMENT; PRODUCTION;
Other versions of this item:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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- Lisette Ibanez & Gilles Grolleau, 2008. "Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 233-249, June.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven, 2003. "Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market," IDEI Working Papers 165, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Lisette Ibanez & Gilles Grolleau, 2008. "Can ecolabeling schemes preserve the environment?," Working Papers 31221, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
- Marette, S. & Crepsi, J.M., 1999.
"Cartel Stability and Quality Signaling,"
99-29, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Alessandro Stanziani, 2004. "Wine Reputation and Quality Controls: The Origin of the AOCs in 19th Century France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 149-167, September.
- Crespi, John M. & Marette, Stephan, 2003. "Some Economic Implications Of Public Labeling," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 34(03), November.
- Stéphan Marette & John Crespi, 2003. "Can Quality Certification Lead to Stable Cartels?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-64, August.
- Louis Jaeck, 2006. "Consumer Behaviour and Environmental Preservation: The Contribution of Informational Cascades Theory," CAE Working Papers 43, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM, revised Dec 2006.
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