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Diversité exogène des entreprises et justification économique d'une politique d'incitation à la coopération en R&D

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  • Mireille Matt
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    Abstract

    [fre] Diversité exogène des entreprises et justification économique d'une politique d'incitation à la . coopération en Recherche et Développement (R&D) . par Mireille Matt . L'objectif principal de cet article est de proposer, à partir d'un modèle à investissements stratégiques, une justification économique de la mise en place d'une politique d'incitation à la coopération en Recherche et Développement (R&D), telle que celles menées par la Communauté Européenne. Cette justification économique repose principalement sur l'introduction d'un paramètre de "spillover " différent pour chacun des duopoleurs, permettant ainsi de considérer des entreprises hétérogènes, tant par la nature de leur recherche effectuée que par leur capacité d' absorption. Sous cette hypothèse d'hétérogénéité, les entreprises ne coopèrent pas spontanément dans toutes les configurations de " spillovers " et nous montrons qu'une politique d'incitation à la coopération devient pertinente. Notre formalisation permet en particulier d'avancer qu'il est socialement souhaitable d'inciter des coopérations entre des entreprises complémentaires d'un point de vue technologique, ce qui correspond notamment aux objectifs des programmes de R&D européens. [eng] Exogenous corporate diversity and economic justification for an incentive policy in favour of R&D . co-operation by Mireille Matt . The main aim of this article is to put forward, using a strategic investment model, an economic justification for the introduction of an incentive policy for co-operation in Research and Development (R&D), of the type implemented by the European Community. This economic justification is based mainly on the introduction of a "spillover parameter" that is different for each of the duopolists, thus making it possible to consider firms to be heterogeneous both in terms of the nature of the research they carry out and in terms of their absorptive capacity. On this assumption of heterogeneity, firms do not spontaneously co-operate in all "spillover" configurations and we show that a policy of incentive to co-operation becomes relevant. Our formalisation makes it possible, in particular, to maintain that it is socially desirable to provide incentives for cooperation between firms that are complementary from a technological point of view, a conclusion which corresponds, in particular, to the aims of the European R&D programmes.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

    Volume (Year): 145 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 117-130

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6118

    Note: DOI:doi:10.3406/ecop.2000.6118
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    Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

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    1. Henriques, Irene, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 638-40, June.
    2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    3. MOTTA, Massimo, 1992. "National R&D cooperation: A special type of strategic policy," CORE Discussion Papers 1992002, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Hagedoorn, John & Schakenraad, Jos, 1992. "Leading companies and networks of strategic alliances in information technologies," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 163-190, April.
    5. De Bondt, Raymond & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1991. "Strategic investment with spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 345-366, October.
    6. Seade, Jesus, 1980. "The stability of cournot revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 15-27, August.
    7. Antonello Zanfei, 1994. "Technological alliances between weak and strong firms : coopérative ventures with asymmetric compétences," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 67(1), pages 255-280.
    8. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December.
    9. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
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