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The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics

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  • Tomáš Otáhal

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the theory of property rights. The second section is dedicated to the explanation of the general concept of agency problem extended with the problem of asymmetric information leading to adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard, in context of previous historical connections. In the last section, the author provides some suggestions for the further theoretical and empirical research.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Politická ekonomie.

Volume (Year): 2009 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 677-695

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Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2009:y:2009:i:5:id:704:p:677-695

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Related research

Keywords: new institutional economics; Moral hazard; asymmetric information; Agency theory; adverse selection;

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References

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  1. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
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  3. Joseph M. Ostroy & Louis Makowski, 2001. "Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 479-535, June.
  4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
  5. Williamson, Oliver E, 1971. "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 112-23, May.
  6. Knight, Frank H, 1942. "Profit and Entrepreneurial Functions," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(S1), pages 126-132, December.
  7. Langlois, Richard N & Cosgel, Metin M, 1993. "Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: A New Interpretation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 456-65, July.
  8. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  9. Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-61, Spring.
  10. Peter Leeson, 2007. "Efficient anarchy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 41-53, January.
  11. North, Douglass C, 1994. "Economic Performance through Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 359-68, June.
  12. Coase, Ronald, 1998. "The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 72-74, May.
  13. Israel Kirzner, 1998. "Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 289-301, December.
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