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Transaction costs and technological development: the case of the Danish fruit and vegetable industry

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  • Foss, Kirsten

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  • Foss, Kirsten, 1996. "Transaction costs and technological development: the case of the Danish fruit and vegetable industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 531-547, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:25:y:1996:i:4:p:531-547
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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Yoram Barzel, 1997. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Chapters, in: Svetozar Pejovich (ed.), The Economic Foundations of Property Rights, chapter 13, pages 171-192, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    4. David J. TEECE, 2008. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Transfer And Licensing Of Know-How And Intellectual Property Understanding the Multinational Enterprise in the Modern World, chapter 5, pages 67-87, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    7. Klevorick, Alvin K. & Levin, Richard C. & Nelson, Richard R. & Winter, Sidney G., 1995. "On the sources and significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 185-205, March.
    8. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    9. Steven Globerman, 1980. "Markets, Hierarchies, and Innovation," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 977-998, December.
    10. Davidson, W H & McFetridge, Donald G, 1984. "International Technology Transactions and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 253-264, March.
    11. Cheung, Steven N S, 1983. "The Contractual Nature of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, April.
    12. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    13. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    14. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    15. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gamal Atallah, 2002. "Production Technology, Information Technology, and Vertical Integration Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 0203EClassification-JEL: , University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    2. Jia, Xiangping & Hu, Yamei & Hendrikse, George & Huanga, Jikun, 2010. "Centralized versus individual: Governance of farmer professional cooperatives in China," IAMO Forum 2010: Institutions in Transition – Challenges for New Modes of Governance 52699, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO).
    3. Nicolai J. Foss, 2002. "The Strategy and Transaction Cost Nexus Past Debates, Central Questions, and Future Research Possibilities," DRUID Working Papers 02-04, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    4. Kirsten Foss, 1998. "Technological Interdependencies,Specialization and Coordination A Property Rights Perspective on The Nature of the Firm," DRUID Working Papers 98-10, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    5. Del Canto, Jesus Galende & Gonzalez, Isabel Suarez, 1999. "A resource-based analysis of the factors determining a firm's R&D activities," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(8), pages 891-905, November.
    6. Emmanuel Raynaud & Loïc Sauvée, 2000. "Signes collectifs de qualité et structures de gouvernance," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 258(1), pages 101-112.
    7. Raynaud, Emmanuel & Sauvee, Loïc, 1999. "Common labelling and producer organisations: a transaction cost economics approach," 67th Seminar, October 28-30, 1999, LeMans, France 241743, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

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