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The Strategy and Transaction Cost Nexus Past Debates, Central Questions, and Future Research Possibilities

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Author Info
Nicolai J. Foss

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Abstract

The role of transaction cost economics in developing research in strategy has been a hotly debated topic over the last decade. This paper presents the radical argument that transaction cost insights are more than merely useful complements to existing approaches to strategy. Rather, they are necessary for adequately understanding the nature of strategizing. This is because transaction costs are essential aspects of processes of creating, capturing and protecting value. If transaction costs are zero, these processes do not pose any strategic problems; strategizing is trivialized in such a world. When transaction costs are positive, on the other hand, opportunities for value creation through the reduction of inefficiencies caused by transaction costs exist, and protecting and appropriating value are costly activities that dissipate value. Also, contracting and expectations enter as central aspects of strategizing. Arguments are provided for why economizing (with transaction costs) is more fundamental than strategizing (in the sense of exploiting market power). Thus, the paper argues that models in which the fullest possible account of transaction costs is made be used as the proper foundations and benchmarks for economics-based strategy research, rather than the patched-up competitive equilibrium models that are now used, more or less implicitly, as the benchmark in important parts of strategy research, most notably in the resource-based view.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies in its series DRUID Working Papers with number 02-04.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:aal:abbswp:02-04

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Web page: http://www.druid.dk/

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Related research
Keywords: Transaction costs; firm strategy; industrial organization.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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  1. Barzel, Yoram, 1994. "The capture of wealth by monopolists and the protection of property rights," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 393-409, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  4. Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo, 1999. "On the tangled discourse between transaction costs economics and competence-based views of the firms: Some comments," LEM Papers Series 1999/08, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Lewin, Peter & Phelan, Steven E, 2000. " An Austrian Theory of the Firm," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 59-79, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Brozen, Yale, 1971. "The Persistence of 'High Rates of Return' in High-Stable Concentration Industries," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 501-12, October.
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