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A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections

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  • Karpov, A.

    (National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Game-theoretic model of election to a corporate board of directors is proposed. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution of seats is unique. The uniqueness guarantees nonmanipulability of elections. The distribution is obtained by the d’Hondt method of seats distribution in proportional representation problem. The model is tested on real data from a Russian company.

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File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2011-12-10-23r.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 12 ()
Pages: 10-23

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Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:12:p:10-23

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Related research

Keywords: Elections; board of directors; equilibrium seats distribution; d'Hondt method;

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  1. Ordeshook, Peter C & Zeng, Langche, 1994. " Some Properties of Hare Voting with Strategic Voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 87-101, January.
  2. Russell Golman & Scott Page, 2009. "General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 279-299, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.
  2. Alexander Karpov, 2014. "Apparentement incentives under the d’Hondt method," KIER Working Papers 896, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

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