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Still Converging? a Downsian Party System Without Polls

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  • Emily Clough

    (Science, Political Research Quarterly and Electoral Studies, eclough@unt.edu)

Abstract

This article compares convergence of political parties when voters are voting strategically and when they are voting sincerely under low-information conditions. In order to examine this problem, I create a computational model of a party system, where parties are uncertain about the distribution of the electorate. In one condition of the model, voters vote sincerely; in another, voters vote strategically. It is found that when voters vote strategically parties are less likely to converge than when voters vote sincerely.

Suggested Citation

  • Emily Clough, 2008. "Still Converging? a Downsian Party System Without Polls," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 461-476, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:4:p:461-476
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629808093776
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    References listed on IDEAS

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