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Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance

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  • Karpov, A.

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

This paper surveys models of cumulative voting in corporate elections that have appeared in the literature. The influence of cumulative voting on company performance and proxy contests is analyzed. The practical issues as well as theoretical aspects of cumulative voting are studied. The particular section is devoted to gametheoretical modeling of the cumulative voting for corporate directors.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 16 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 10-25

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Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:16:p:10-25

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Keywords: board of directors; corporate governance; cumulative voting;

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  1. Heron, Randall A. & Lewellen, Wilbur G., 1998. "An Empirical Analysis of the Reincorporation Decision," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 549-568, December.
  2. Jie Cai & Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, 2009. "Electing Directors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2389-2421, October.
  3. Gerald J. Glasser, 1959. "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(2), pages 151-156, January.
  4. Bhagat, Sanjai & Brickley, James A, 1984. "Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 339-65, October.
  5. Forjan, James M., 1999. "The wealth effects of shareholder-sponsored proposals," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 61-72, June.
  6. Easterbrook, Frank H & Fischel, Daniel R, 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 395-427, June.
  7. Dolgopyatova, T., 2012. "Corporate Conflicts and Risks for Dominant Owners," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 158-160.
  8. Aiwu Zhao & Alexander J. Brehm, 2011. "Cumulative voting and the conflicts between board and minority shareholders," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 465-473, May.
  9. David Yermack, 2010. "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 103-125, December.
  10. Karpov, A., 2011. "A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 12, pages 10-23.
  11. Ikenberry, David & Lakonishok, Josef, 1993. "Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 405-35, July.
  12. Kapelyushnikov, R., 2012. "Property Rights' Insecurity and Its Economic Effects: Russian Experience," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 150-153.
  13. Ernst Maug & Kristian Rydqvist, 2009. "Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 47-79.
  14. Dodd, Peter & Warner, Jerold B., 1983. "On corporate governance : A study of proxy contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 401-438, April.
  15. Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 1998. "On the uses of corporate governance provisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 347-371, December.
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