IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nea/journl/y2012i16p10-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Karpov, A.

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

This paper surveys models of cumulative voting in corporate elections that have appeared in the literature. The influence of cumulative voting on company performance and proxy contests is analyzed. The practical issues as well as theoretical aspects of cumulative voting are studied. The particular section is devoted to gametheoretical modeling of the cumulative voting for corporate directors.

Suggested Citation

  • Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.
  • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:16:p:10-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2012-16-10-25r.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dodd, Peter & Warner, Jerold B., 1983. "On corporate governance : A study of proxy contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 401-438, April.
    2. W. H. S. Stevens, 1926. "Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(3), pages 353-392.
    3. Bhagat, Sanjai & Brickley, James A, 1984. "Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 339-365, October.
    4. Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 1998. "On the uses of corporate governance provisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 347-371, December.
    5. Forjan, James M., 1999. "The wealth effects of shareholder-sponsored proposals," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 61-72, June.
    6. Chamu Sundaramurthy & James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney, 1997. "Board Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, And Stockholder Wealth," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 231-245, March.
    7. Heron, Randall A. & Lewellen, Wilbur G., 1998. "An Empirical Analysis of the Reincorporation Decision," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 549-568, December.
    8. Dolgopyatova, T., 2012. "Corporate Conflicts and Risks for Dominant Owners," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 158-160.
    9. Gerald J. Glasser, 1959. "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(2), pages 151-156, January.
    10. Karpov, A., 2011. "A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 12, pages 10-23.
    11. Kapelyushnikov, R., 2012. "Property Rights' Insecurity and Its Economic Effects: Russian Experience," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 150-153.
    12. Easterbrook, Frank H & Fischel, Daniel R, 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 395-427, June.
    13. Ernst Maug & Kristian Rydqvist, 2009. "Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 47-79.
    14. Ikenberry, David & Lakonishok, Josef, 1993. "Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 405-435, July.
    15. David Yermack, 2010. "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 103-125, December.
    16. Jie Cai & Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, 2009. "Electing Directors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2389-2421, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Chen & Duane J. Seppi & Chester S. Spatt, 2009. "The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting," NBER Working Papers 15143, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Li, Yuanzhi & Yermack, David, 2016. "Evasive shareholder meetings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 318-334.
    3. Nenova, Tatiana, 2006. "Takeover laws and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4029, The World Bank.
    4. Ouyang, Wenjing, 2015. "The effect of M&A advisors’ opinions on acquirer shareholder voting," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 175-190.
    5. David Yermack & Yuanzhi Li, 2014. "Evasive Shareholder Meetings," NBER Working Papers 19991, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
    7. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
    8. Holderness, Clifford G., 2018. "Equity issuances and agency costs: The telling story of shareholder approval around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 415-439.
    9. Christopher S. Armstrong & Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, 2013. "The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 909-950, December.
    10. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," NBER Working Papers 29005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Correa, Ricardo & Lel, Ugur, 2016. "Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 500-520.
    12. Howard Bodenhorn, 2014. "Voting Rights, Shareholdings, and Leverage at Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 431-458.
    13. Fang Chen & Jian Huang & Han Yu, 2020. "The intra-industry effects of proxy contests," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 44(2), pages 321-347, April.
    14. Lin, Yu-Hsin & Chang, Yun-chien, 2017. "Does mandating cumulative voting weaken controlling shareholders? A difference-in-differences approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 111-123.
    15. Nelson, James, 2005. "Corporate governance practices, CEO characteristics and firm performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 197-228, March.
    16. Havranek, Tomas & Bajzík, Josef & Irsova, Zuzana & Novak, Jiri, 2023. "Does Shareholder Activism Create Value? A Meta-Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 18233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Malenko, Nadya & Levit, Doron & Maug, Ernst, 2022. "Trading and shareholder democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Vizcaíno, Marcos & Chousa, Juan P., 2016. "Analyzing the influence of the funds' support on Tobin's q using SEM and fsQCA," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 2118-2124.
    19. Hanson, Robert C. & Song, Moon H., 2000. "Managerial ownership, board structure, and the division of gains in divestitures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 55-70, March.
    20. Steve Sauerwald & J. (Hans) Van Oosterhout & Marc Van Essen, 2016. "Expressive Shareholder Democracy: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent in 15 Western European Countries," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 520-551, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    board of directors; corporate governance; cumulative voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:16:p:10-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexey Tcharykov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nearuea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.