On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
AbstractAccording to Becker´s human-capital theory, employers tend to underinvest in general training relative to specific training because it increases their existing employees´ outside opportunities. We show that this is not necessarily true if training has an information-gathering function that allows an agent to learn his skills. An example is the training of new hires. When training creates an information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the principal may overinvest in general training relative to specific training. General training helps the principal reduce the incentive problem inside the firm. Becker´s result of underinvestment in general training may not hold when training creates asymmetric information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 165 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2009. "On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires," Working Papers UWEC-2008-24-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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