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Weak Property Rights and Holdup in R&D

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Author Info
Bharat N. Anand
Alexander Galetovic
Abstract

We study how the sequence of financing of R&D varies according to the ease with which property rights over knowledge can be defined. There are two financiers: a venture capitalist (VC) and a corporation. The knowledge acquired in costly research becomes embodied in the researcher's human capital, and she may hold up the financier and walk away with the project to develop it elsewhere. The main results are: (1) When property rights are strong, research is always funded by the VC, development is performed efficiently, and breakaways from the VC to the corporation are observed in equilibrium. (2) When property rights are weak, projects may be financed by the VC or the corporation, or may remain unfunded. (3) When property rights are weak, no breakaways occur in equilibrium; local spillovers and strong product market competition increase the likelihood that research projects will get funding. (4) The equilibrium sequence of R&D finance need not be first-best efficient. (5) In equilibrium, and controlling for the strength of property rights, VCs finance projects that are more profitable on average. Copyright (c) 2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

Volume (Year): 9 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 615-642
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:9:y:2000:i:4:p:615-642

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  1. Bronwyn H. Hall, 2003. "The Financing of Research and Development," Finance 0303003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2008. "Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes," Working Papers w0118, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Stefan ARPING, 2002. "Cannibalization & Incentives in Venture Financing," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 02.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised May 2002. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luca Colombo & Herbert Dawid, 2008. "Complementary Assets, Start-Ups and Incentives to Innovate," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0080, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE). [Downloadable!]
  5. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/478, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Patents vs Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover," Working Papers w0064, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), revised Feb 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Goldfarb, Brent & Henrekson, Magnus, 2001. "Bottom-Up vs. Top-Down Policies towards the Commercialization of University Intellectual Property," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 463, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 26 May 2002. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ari Hyytinen & Mika Pajarinen, 2002. "Small Business Finance in Finland. A Descriptive Study," Discussion Papers 812, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
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