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Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments

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Author Info
Bontems, Philippe
Bourgeon, Jean-Marc

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-3YS391N-2/2/b0e184db41b4d7556549f13282dcbd03
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 76 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 181-202
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:76:y:2000:i:2:p:181-202

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Crepin, Anne-Sophie & Jayet, Pierre-Alain, 2002. "Set-Aside versus Quotas in Contracts for Agro-Environmental Regulation," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24950, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Endogenous Managerial Contract," CSEF Working Papers 148, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2007. "Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington. [Downloadable!]
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