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Norms of Cooperation, Trust, Altruism, and Fairness: Evidence from Lab Experiments on Pakistani Students

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  • Theresa Thompson Chaudhry

    ()
    (Lahore School of Economics, Pakistan.)

  • Misha Saleem

    ()
    (Lahore School of Economics, Pakistan.)

Abstract

A rich area of economic research focuses on the role of controlled experiments to understand interactions between agents and agents’ own deepseeded preferences as they pertain to pro-social behavior. Four of the most common games—the prisoner’s dilemma, and the trust, ultimatum, and dictator games—have been used both in laboratory and field settings, and with student and nonstudent participants. Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) have compiled evidence for these four games that has been collected from behavioral experiments conducted in the US and a number of developing countries. In this paper, we wish to add to the existing evidence by presenting the results of lab experiments carried out on a population of economics students at a university in Lahore.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics in its journal Lahore Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 16 (2011)
Issue (Month): Special Edition (September)
Pages: 347-375

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Handle: RePEc:lje:journl:v:16:y:2011:i:sp:p:347-375

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Keywords: Behavioral Environment; Games; Lahore; Pakistan.;

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References

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  1. Danielson, Anders & Holm, Hakan J, 2002. "Trust in the Tropics? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," Working Papers 2002:12, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  2. Murnighan, J. Keith & Saxon, Michael Scott, 1998. "Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 415-445, August.
  3. E. Fehr & John A. List, . "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs," IEW - Working Papers 134, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Lazzarini, S. G. & Madalozzo, R. C & Artes, R. & Siqueira, J. O., 2004. "Measuring trust: An experiment in Brazil," Insper Working Papers wpe_42, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  5. Robert H. Frank & Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, 1993. "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 159-171, Spring.
  6. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 163-182, February.
  7. Shahid Razzaque, 2009. "The Ultimatum Game and Gender Effect: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 48(1), pages 23-46.
  8. Gowdy, John & Iorgulescu, Raluca & Onyeiwu, Stephen, 2003. "Fairness and retaliation in a rural Nigerian village," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 469-479, December.
  9. Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-85, May.
  10. Adeline Delavande & Basit Zafar, 2011. "Stereotypes and madrassas: experimental evidence from Pakistan," Staff Reports 501, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  11. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  12. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S., 1999. "The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
  13. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
  14. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2008. "Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(3), pages 311-338.
  15. Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
  16. Keith Murnighan & M Saxon, 1998. "Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults," Artefactual Field Experiments 00100, The Field Experiments Website.
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