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Appropriate contract durations in the German markets for on-line reserve capacity

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  • Sebastian Just

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  • Sebastian Just, 2011. "Appropriate contract durations in the German markets for on-line reserve capacity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 194-220, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:39:y:2011:i:2:p:194-220
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-010-9141-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bushnell, James B & Oren, Shmuel S, 1994. "Bidder Cost Revelation in Electric Power Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-26, February.
    2. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Reliability and competitive electricity markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 60-84, March.
    3. Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L & Wilson, Bart J, 2003. "Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 109-123, March.
    4. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    5. Federico, Giulio & Rahman, David, 2003. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 175-211, September.
    6. Kamat, Rajnish & Oren, Shmuel S, 2002. "Rational Buyer Meets Rational Seller: Reserves Market Equilibria under Alternative Auction Designs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 247-288, May.
    7. Just, Sebastian & Weber, Christoph, 2008. "Pricing of reserves: Valuing system reserve capacity against spot prices in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 3198-3221, November.
    8. Robert Wilson, 2002. "Architecture of Power Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1299-1340, July.
    9. Natalia Fabra & Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing Electricity Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, Spring.
    10. Bower, John & Bunn, Derek, 2001. "Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 561-592, March.
    11. John Bower & Derek W. Bunn, 2000. "Model-Based Comparisons of Pool and Bilateral Markets for Electricity," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 1-29.
    12. Peter Cramton & Hung-po Chao & Robert Wilson, 2005. "Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England," Papers of Peter Cramton 05mdi, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.
    13. Chao, Hung-Po & Wilson, Robert, 2002. "Multi-dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserves: Robust Incentive-Compatible Scoring and Settlement Rules," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 161-183, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Heim, Sven & Götz, Georg, 2021. "Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    2. Sebastian Just & Christoph Weber, 2012. "Strategic Behavior in the German Balancing Energy Mechanism: Incentives, Evidence, Costs and Solutions," EWL Working Papers 1204, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics, revised Oct 2012.
    3. Furtwängler, Christian & Weber, Christoph, 2019. "Spot and reserve market equilibria and the influence of new reserve market participants," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 408-421.
    4. Joos, Michael & Staffell, Iain, 2018. "Short-term integration costs of variable renewable energy: Wind curtailment and balancing in Britain and Germany," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 45-65.
    5. Märkle-Huß, Joscha & Feuerriegel, Stefan & Neumann, Dirk, 2018. "Contract durations in the electricity market: Causal impact of 15min trading on the EPEX SPOT market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 367-378.
    6. Hu, Jing & Harmsen, Robert & Crijns-Graus, Wina & Worrell, Ernst & van den Broek, Machteld, 2018. "Identifying barriers to large-scale integration of variable renewable electricity into the electricity market: A literature review of market design," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 81(P2), pages 2181-2195.
    7. Christian Furtwaengler & Christoph Weber, "undated". "Reserve Provision by CHP Units and its Impact on Equilibria in Spot and Reserve Markets," EWL Working Papers 1803, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics.
    8. Casimir Lorenz & Clemens Gerbaulet, 2017. "Wind Providing Balancing Reserves: An Application to the German Electricity System of 2025," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1655, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Schillinger, Moritz, 2019. "Balancing Market Design and Opportunity Cost - The Swiss Case," Working papers 2019/14, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    10. Richter, Jan, 2011. "A Unique Competitive Equilibrium on Interdependent Spot Electricity and Reserve Capacity Markets," EWI Working Papers 2011-9, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    11. Fridrik Mar Baldursson & Julia Bellenbaum & Lenja Niesen & Christoph Weber, 2022. "Welfare optimal reliability and reserve provision in electricity markets with increasing shares of renewable energy sources," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 47-79, December.
    12. Sebastian Just & Christoph Weber, 2015. "Strategic behavior in the German balancing energy mechanism: incentives, evidence, costs and solutions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 218-243, October.
    13. Xu, Bing & Nayak, Amar & Gray, David & Ouenniche, Jamal, 2016. "Assessing energy business cases implemented in the North Sea Region and strategy recommendations," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 360-371.
    14. Schillinger, Moritz, 2020. "Balancing-market design and opportunity cost: The Swiss case," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    15. Knaut, Andreas & Obermüller, Frank & Weiser, Florian, 2017. "Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power Markets," EWI Working Papers 2017-4, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity markets; Contract duration; Power systems reserve; Ancillary service; Primary reserve; Secondary reserve; Spinning reserve; Opportunity costs; Equilibrium model; L94; L11; D41; D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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