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Strategic Behavior in the German Balancing Energy Mechanism: Incentives, Evidence, Costs and Solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Sebastian Just
  • Christoph Weber

    (Chair for Management Sciences and Energy Economics, University of Duisburg-Essen)

Abstract

This paper investigates the incentives market participants have in the German electricity balancing mechanism. Strategic over- and undersupply positions are the result of existing stochastic arbitrage opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mechanism. This strategic behavior can be clearly identified in aggregate market data. These structural imbalances increase the need for reserve capacity, raise system security concerns, and thus burden significant cost on the customers. More effective market designs include changes in the balancing mechanism, the reserve capacity and the intraday spot markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Just & Christoph Weber, 2012. "Strategic Behavior in the German Balancing Energy Mechanism: Incentives, Evidence, Costs and Solutions," EWL Working Papers 1204, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics, revised Oct 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:dui:wpaper:1204
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bushnell, James B & Oren, Shmuel S, 1994. "Bidder Cost Revelation in Electric Power Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-26, February.
    2. Sebastian Just, 2011. "Appropriate contract durations in the German markets for on-line reserve capacity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 194-220, April.
    3. Müller, Gernot & Rammerstorfer, Margarethe, 2008. "A theoretical analysis of procurement auctions for tertiary control in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 2620-2627, July.
    4. Möller, Christoph & Rachev, Svetlozar T. & Fabozzi, Frank J., 2011. "Balancing energy strategies in electricity portfolio management," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 2-11, January.
    5. Just, Sebastian & Weber, Christoph, 2008. "Pricing of reserves: Valuing system reserve capacity against spot prices in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 3198-3221, November.
    6. Vandezande, Leen & Meeus, Leonardo & Belmans, Ronnie & Saguan, Marcelo & Glachant, Jean-Michel, 2010. "Well-functioning balancing markets: A prerequisite for wind power integration," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 3146-3154, July.
    7. Rammerstorfer, Margarethe & Wagner, Christian, 2009. "Reforming minute reserve policy in Germany: A step towards efficient markets?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3513-3519, September.
    8. Chao, Hung-Po & Wilson, Robert, 2002. "Multi-dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserves: Robust Incentive-Compatible Scoring and Settlement Rules," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 161-183, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Derek W. Bunn & Angelica Gianfreda & Stefan Kermer, 2018. "A Trading-Based Evaluation of Density Forecasts in a Real-Time Electricity Market," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-13, October.
    2. Hu, Jing & Harmsen, Robert & Crijns-Graus, Wina & Worrell, Ernst & van den Broek, Machteld, 2018. "Identifying barriers to large-scale integration of variable renewable electricity into the electricity market: A literature review of market design," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 81(P2), pages 2181-2195.
    3. Duso, Tomaso & Szücs, Florian & Böckers, Veit, 2020. "Abuse of dominance and antitrust enforcement in the German electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    4. Kiesel, Rüdiger & Paraschiv, Florentina, 2017. "Econometric analysis of 15-minute intraday electricity prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 77-90.
    5. Christian Pape, 2017. "The impact of intraday markets on the market value of flexibility–Decomposing effects on profile and the imbalance costs," EWL Working Papers 1711, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics, revised Dec 2017.
    6. Hanemann, Philipp & Bruckner, Thomas, 2016. "Retrieval Probabilities of Secondary Control Reserve within Systems with a High Share of Renewable Energies," Contributions of the Institute for Infrastructure and Resources Management 01/2016, University of Leipzig, Institute for Infrastructure and Resources Management.
    7. Chaves-Ávila, José Pablo & van der Veen, Reinier A.C. & Hakvoort, Rudi A., 2014. "The interplay between imbalance pricing mechanisms and network congestions – Analysis of the German electricity market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 52-61.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity market design; balancing mechanism; reserve capacity; strategic behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q47 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy Forecasting

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