Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Local government internal structure, external constraints and the median voter

Contents:

Author Info

  • Geoffrey Turnbull

    ()

  • Gyusuck Geon
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper examines how internal structure and external constraints affect local government ability to meet voters' demands. It applies the revealed preference method to US counties to identify those that fail to satisfy the pure democracy outcome of the median voter hypothesis (MVH). Probit analysis identifies the factors associated with counties that satisfy the MVH. Internal government structure does not matter but restricting home rule increases the likelihood of satisfying the MVH equilibrium, the latter result consistent with the leviathan model. The systematic differences found for urban and rural county governments reinforce this conclusion. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9068-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 129 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 487-506

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:3:p:487-506

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

    Related research

    Keywords: Home rule; Leviathan; Median voter hypothesis;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
    2. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
    3. Varian, Hal R, 1982. "The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 945-73, July.
    4. Chang, Chinkun & Turnbull, Geoffrey K, 2002. " Bureaucratic Behavior in the Local Public Sector: A Revealed Preference Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 191-210, October.
    5. Rebecca J. Campbell, 2004. "Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion in Local Government Overlapping Jurisdictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(3_4), pages 301-329, 09.
    6. Turnbull, Geoffrey K. & Niho, Yoshio, 1986. "The optimal property tax with mobile nonresidential capital," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 223-239, March.
    7. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-96, June.
    8. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, October.
    9. Turnbull, Geoffrey K & Djoundourian, Salpie S, 1994. " The Median Voter Hypothesis: Evidence from General Purpose Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 223-40, December.
    10. Turnbull, Geoffrey K & Djoundourian, Salpie S, 1993. " Overlapping Jurisdictions: Substitutes or Complements?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 231-45, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. George W. Hammond & Mehmet S. Tosun, 2011. "The Impact Of Local Decentralization On Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. Counties," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 47-64, 02.
    2. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Wallace E. Oates, 2012. "On Fiscal Illusion and Ricardian Equivalence in Local Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 18040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. James LeSage & Matthew Dominguez, 2012. "The importance of modeling spatial spillovers in public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 525-545, March.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:3:p:487-506. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.