Local government internal structure, external constraints and the median voter
AbstractThis paper examines how internal structure and external constraints affect local government ability to meet voters' demands. It applies the revealed preference method to US counties to identify those that fail to satisfy the pure democracy outcome of the median voter hypothesis (MVH). Probit analysis identifies the factors associated with counties that satisfy the MVH. Internal government structure does not matter but restricting home rule increases the likelihood of satisfying the MVH equilibrium, the latter result consistent with the leviathan model. The systematic differences found for urban and rural county governments reinforce this conclusion. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 129 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Home rule; Leviathan; Median voter hypothesis;
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