The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 99 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
Contract; Moral hazard; Free resource; Basic research; Open source; D23; L11; L15;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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NBER Working Papers
6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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- Rajeev K. Goel & Daniel P. Rich, 2005. "Organization of Markets for Science and Technology," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(1), pages 1-, March.
- Salter, Ammon J. & Martin, Ben R., 2001. "The economic benefits of publicly funded basic research: a critical review," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 509-532, March.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & Pandey, Priyanka, 2000. "Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 303-326, December.
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