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Incentives and spillovers in R&D activities: an agency-theoretic analysis of industry-university relations

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Author Info
Nicola Lacetera (Massachusetts Institute of Technology -- Sloan School)

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Abstract

In this paper, I study industry-university relations in a principal- agent framework. Following the existing literature, these relations are interpreted in two ways: (1) as occurring through spillovers of knowledge among different groups of researchers, working for different institutional settings; or (2) as more formal interactions, through the possibility, for a scientist, to directly respond to incentives defined by the different communities she may belong to. I formalize these two configurations in a unified framework. I account for: (1) the inherent difficulty in measuring the impact of scientific activities; and (2) the multiplicity of activities that scientists perform. I combine multi-task agency models with distorted performance measures and common agency models. My model identifies several types of incongruities between an agent's actions and the desired outcomes. These incongruities derive also from the strategic interaction among the principals. I also identify some potentially distortionary behavioral effects of the presence of spillovers.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0312004.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 16 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0312004

Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 35
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Economics of Science; Agency Theory; Industry-University Relations; Science Policy; R&D Management.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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