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An evasive topic: theorizing about the hidden economy

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  • Agnar Sandmo

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-011-9185-9
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

    Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (February)
    Pages: 5-24

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:19:y:2012:i:1:p:5-24

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

    Related research

    Keywords: Tax evasion; Expected utility; The hidden economy; Optimal taxation; H26;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2005. "Why Do People Pay Taxes? Prospect Theory Versus Expected Utility Theory," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/23, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Aug 2006.
    2. Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis L, 1998. "A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 165-83, January.
    3. Bhagwati, Jagdish & Srinivasan, T. N., 1973. "Smuggling and trade policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 377-389.
    4. Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
    5. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2009. "Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with an Informal Sector," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, February.
    6. Chetty, Nadarajan, 2009. "Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance," Scholarly Articles 9748527, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    7. Schneider, Friedrich, 2005. "Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 598-642, September.
    8. Pencavel, John H., 1979. "A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 115-124, August.
    9. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Hansen, Bent, 1973. "A Theoretical Analysis of Smuggling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 172-87, May.
    10. Martin Feldstein, 1995. "Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax," NBER Working Papers 5055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Bernasconi, Michele, 1998. "Tax evasion and orders of risk aversion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 123-134, January.
    12. Pestieau, Pierre & Possen, Uri M., 1991. "Tax evasion and occupational choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 107-125, June.
    13. Slemrod, Joel & Kopczuk, Wojciech, 2002. "The optimal elasticity of taxable income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 91-112, April.
    14. Martin, Lawrence & Panagariya, Arvind, 1984. "Smuggling, trade, and price disparity: A crime-theoretic approach," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3-4), pages 201-217, November.
    15. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2000. "The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(6), pages 641-664, December.
    16. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Agnar Sandmo, 2002. "Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 85-103, September.
    18. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1993. "Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 261-275, February.
    19. Marrelli, Massimo, 1984. "On indirect tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 181-196, November.
    20. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    21. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
    22. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1996. "Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-249, May.
    23. Andvig, Jens Chr. & Moene, Karl Ove, 1990. "How corruption may corrupt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 63-76, January.
    24. Snow, Arthur & Warren, Ronald Jr., 2005. "Tax evasion under random audits with uncertain detection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 97-100, July.
    25. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    26. Sandmo, Agnar, 2005. "The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 58(4), pages 643-63, December.
    27. Srinivasan, T. N., 1973. "Tax evasion: A model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 339-346.
    28. Lars P. Feld & Friedrich Schneider, 2010. "Survey on the Shadow Economy and Undeclared Earnings in OECD Countries," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11, pages 109-149, 05.
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    Cited by:
    1. Bittencourt, Manoel & Gupta, Rangan & Stander, Lardo, 2014. "Tax evasion, financial development and inflation: Theory and empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 194-208.
    2. Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2013. "Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth," MPRA Paper 48427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Chandler McClellan, 2014. "Corruption and Firm Tax Evasion," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1422, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    4. Andras Simonovits, 2013. "Does Higher Tax Morale Imply Higher Optimal Labor Income Tax Rate?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 97-114, June.
    5. James Alm & Keith Finlay, 2012. "Who Benefits from Tax Evasion?," Working Papers 1214, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    6. Alstadsæter, Annette & Jacob, Martin, 2013. "The effect of awareness and incentives on tax evasion," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 147, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    7. Marcelo Bergolo & Guillermo Cruces, 2014. "Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension," CEDLAS, Working Papers 0161, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    8. Alm, James & Hodge, Timothy R. & Sands, Gary & Skidmore, Mark, 2014. "Property Tax Delinquency - Social Contract in Crisis: The Case of Detroit," Working Paper Series 3149, Victoria University of Wellington, Chair in Public Finance.
    9. James Alm, 2013. "Expanding the Theory of Tax Compliance from Individual to Group Motivations," Working Papers 1309, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    10. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    11. Kountouris, Yiannis & Remoundou, Kyriaki, 2013. "Is there a cultural component in tax morale? Evidence from immigrants in Europe," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 104-119.

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