This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Reimbursing Preventive Care

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Francesca Barigozzi ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The paper focuses on secondary prevention, such as diagnostic screening, medical examinations and checks-up, which refers to the early detection of disease. Secondary prevention is analyzed as a self-insurance activity reducing the negative shock of illness and can be either complement or substitute to illness treatment. This paper analyses the optimal reimbursement scheme for both prevention and treatment when each activity receives either a linear subsidy (i.e. cost sharing) or tax. Although optimal reimbursement systematically encourages treatment, it positively affects prevention if and only if prevention reduces the cost of treatment, that is in the case the two activities are substitutes.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0926-4957/contents
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal The GENEVA PAPERS on Risk and Insurance Theory.

Volume (Year): 29 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 165-186
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:geneva:v:29:y:2004:i:2:p:165-186

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102897

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Besley, Timothy J., 1988. "Optimal reimbursement health insurance and the theory of Ramsey taxation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 321-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dixit, Avinash, 1985. "Tax policy in open economies," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 313-374 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bond, Eric W & Crocker, Keith J, 1991. "Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 177-200, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ma, Ching-to Albert & McGuire, Thomas G, 1997. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 685-704, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Garber, Alan M. & Phelps, Charles E., 1997. "Economic foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Philipson, Tomas, 1997. "Disease Eradication: Private versus Public Vaccination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 222-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Schneider, Udo & Zerth, Jürgen, 2008. "Improving prevention compliance through appropriate incentives," MPRA Paper 8280, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. F. Barigozzi, 2004. "Supplementary Insurance with Ex-Post Moral Hazard: Efficiency and Redistribution," Working Papers 521, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.