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Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance

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  • Petretto, Alessandro

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (1999)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 727-745

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:18:y:1999:i:6:p:727-745

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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References

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  1. Blomqvist, Ake & Johansson, Per-Olov, 1996. "Economic Efficiency and Mixed Public/Private Insurance," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 110, Stockholm School of Economics.
  2. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1995. "Redistributive Taxation and Social Insurance," CORE Discussion Papers 1995054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Mooney, Gavin & Ryan, Mandy, 1993. "Agency in health care: Getting beyond first principles," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 125-135, July.
  4. Deaton, Angus, 1981. "Optimal Taxes and the Structure of Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1245-60, September.
  5. Ma, Ching-to Albert & McGuire, Thomas G, 1997. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 685-704, September.
  6. Blomquist, S. & Christiansen, V., 1995. "Topping Up of Opting Out? The Optimal Design of Public Provision Schemes," Papers 1995-13, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  7. Blomqvist, Ake, 1997. "Optimal non-linear health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 303-321, June.
  8. Selden, Thomas M., 1993. "Should the government provide catastrophic insurance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 241-247, June.
  9. Blomqvist, Ake & Horn, Henrik, 1984. "Public health insurance and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 353-371, August.
  10. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Publicly provided disaster insurance for health and the control of moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 141-156, July.
  11. Jack, William & Sheiner, Louise, 1997. "Welfare-Improving Health Expenditure Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 206-21, March.
  12. Besley, Timothy J., 1988. "Optimal reimbursement health insurance and the theory of Ramsey taxation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 321-336, December.
  13. van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M., 1995. "Regulated competition in health care: With or without a global budget?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 786-794, April.
  14. Jean-Charles Rochet, 1991. "Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 16(2), pages 143-165, December.
  15. Selden, Thomas M., 1997. "More on the economic efficiency of mixed public/private insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 517-523, December.
  16. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
  17. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Sato, Motohiro, 1998. " Subsidies versus Public Provision of Private Goods as Instruments for Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(3), pages 545-64, September.
  18. Deaton, Angus, 1979. "Optimally uniform commodity taxes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 357-361.
  19. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
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