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The interaction of partial public insurance programs and residual private insurance markets: evidence from the US Medicare program

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  • Finkelstein, Amy
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

    Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 1-24

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:23:y:2004:i:1:p:1-24

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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    1. Eckstein, Zvi & Eichenbaum, Martin & Peled, Dan, 1985. "Uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 303-326, April.
    2. Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October.
    3. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
    4. Marquis, M. Susan, 1992. "Adverse selection with a multiple choice among health insurance plans: A simulation analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 129-151, August.
    5. Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "The Interaction of Partial Public Insurance Programs and Residual Private Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.S. Medicare Program," NBER Working Papers 9031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Selden, Thomas M., 1997. "More on the economic efficiency of mixed public/private insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 517-523, December.
    7. Cutler, David M & Gruber, Jonathan, 1996. "Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 391-430, May.
    8. Selden, Thomas M., 1993. "Should the government provide catastrophic insurance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 241-247, June.
    9. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Publicly provided disaster insurance for health and the control of moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 141-156, July.
    10. Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "When Can Partial Public Insurance Produce Pareto Improvements?," NBER Working Papers 9035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Andrew B. Abel, 1985. "Capital Accumulation and Uncertain Lifetimes with Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 1664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
    13. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    14. Blomqvist, Ake & Johansson, Per-Olov, 1996. "Economic Efficiency and Mixed Public/Private Insurance," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 110, Stockholm School of Economics.
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    Cited by:
    1. Bulent Guler & Temel Taskin, 2013. "Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd out Home Production?," Working Papers 1323, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
    2. Saez, Emmanuel & Chetty, Nadarajan, 2010. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," Scholarly Articles 9696326, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Liu, Hong & Gao, Song & Rizzo, John A., 2011. "The expansion of public health insurance and the demand for private health insurance in rural China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 28-41, March.
    4. Baicker, Katherine & Chernew, Michael E. & Robbins, Jacob A., 2013. "The spillover effects of Medicare managed care: Medicare Advantage and hospital utilization," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1289-1300.
    5. Devlin, Rose Anne & Sarma, Sisira & Zhang, Qi, 2011. "The role of supplemental coverage in a universal health insurance system: Some Canadian evidence," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 81-90, April.
    6. Xuezheng Qin & Gordon Liu, 2013. "Does the US health care safety net discourage private insurance coverage?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 457-469, June.
    7. Peter Wakker & Danielle Timmermans & Irma Machielse, 2007. "The effects of statistical information on risk ambiguity attitudes, and on rational insurance decisions," Natural Field Experiments 00338, The Field Experiments Website.
    8. Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, 2012. "Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data," NBER Working Papers 18433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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