Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Remedies for Sick Insurance,"
620, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 302, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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- Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "Minimum Standards and Insurance Regulation: Evidence from the Medigap Market," NBER Working Papers 8917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00587713 is not listed on IDEAS
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Minimum Coverage Regulation in Insurance Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 301, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Yukihiro Nishimura, 2009. "Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 176-197, April.
- Jeonghoon Ahn, 2004. "Panel Data Sample Selection Model: an Application to Employee Choice of Health Plan Type and Medical Cost Estimation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 560, Econometric Society.
- Belli, Paolo, 2001. "How adverse selection affects the health insurance market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2574, The World Bank.
- Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "When Can Partial Public Insurance Produce Pareto Improvements?," NBER Working Papers 9035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Encinosa, William, 2001. "A comment on Neudeck and Podczeck's "adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets"," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 667-673, July.
- Encinosa, William, 2001. "The economics of regulatory mandates on the HMO market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 85-107, January.
- Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2002. "Setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care: minimum variance optimal risk adjustment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 153-173, May.
- Sandro Leal Alves, 2007. "Saúde Suplementar: Evidências De Seleção Adversa Após A Regulação," Anais do XXXV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 35th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 081, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
- Selden, Thomas M., 1999. "Premium subsidies for health insurance: excessive coverage vs. adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 709-725, December.
- Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo Zeidan, 2010. "Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some empirical evidence," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 413-418, August.
- Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2515-2547, December.
- Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "The interaction of partial public insurance programs and residual private insurance markets: evidence from the US Medicare program," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24, January.
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