Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

A theoretical investigation of the reformed public health insurance in urban China

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jihong Ding

    ()

  • Minglai Zhu

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11459-009-0001-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Frontiers of Economics in China.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 1-29

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:spr:frecch:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:1-29

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11459

    Order Information:
    Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

    Related research

    Keywords: health insurance; medical service utilization; moral hazard; co-payment rate; physicians’ incentive; I11; I18; 医疗保险; 医疗服务使用; 道德风险; 自负比率; 医生动机;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier.
    2. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1999. "The Anatomy of Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 7176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Richard Dusansky & �agatay Koç, 2006. "Health Care, Insurance, and the Contract Choice Effect," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(1), pages 121-127, January.
    4. Blomqvist, Ake & Johansson, Per-Olov, 1996. "Economic Efficiency and Mixed Public/Private Insurance," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 110, Stockholm School of Economics.
    5. Ehrlich, Isaac, 2000. "Uncertain lifetime, life protection, and the value of life saving," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 341-367, May.
    6. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
    7. Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Riordan, 1997. "Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care," Papers 0080, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    8. Petretto, Alessandro, 1999. "Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 727-745, December.
    9. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
    10. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-77, June.
    11. Isaac Ehrlich & Yong Yin, 2005. "Explaining Diversities in Age-Specific Life Expectancies and Values of Life Saving: A Numerical Analysis," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 129-162, September.
    12. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Publicly provided disaster insurance for health and the control of moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 141-156, July.
    13. Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans, 2002. "Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 739-756, September.
    14. Selden, Thomas M., 1993. "Should the government provide catastrophic insurance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 241-247, June.
    15. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 2001. "Health insurance: tradeoffs revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 289-293, March.
    16. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-80, Part I, M.
    17. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:frecch:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:1-29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.