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A theoretical investigation of the reformed public health insurance in urban China

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Author Info
Jihong Ding ()
Minglai Zhu ()
Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11459-009-0001-8
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Frontiers of Economics in China.

Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-29
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Handle: RePEc:spr:frecch:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:1-29

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Related research
Keywords: health insurance; medical service utilization; moral hazard; co-payment rate; physicians’ incentive; I11; I18; 医疗保险; 医疗服务使用; 道德风险; 自负比率; 医生动机;

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  1. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Petretto, Alessandro, 1999. "Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 727-745, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-80, Part I, M. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans, 2002. "Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 739-756, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Publicly provided disaster insurance for health and the control of moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 141-156, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 2001. "Health insurance: tradeoffs revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 289-293, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Isaac Ehrlich & Yong Yin, 2005. "Explaining Diversities in Age-Specific Life Expectancies and Values of Life Saving: A Numerical Analysis," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 129-162, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. David Bardey & Romain Lesur, 2006. "Optimal regulation of health system with induced demand and 'ex post' moral hazard," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 83-84, pages 11, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
  13. Selden, Thomas M., 1993. "Should the government provide catastrophic insurance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 241-247, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Blomqvist, A. & Johansson, P-O., 1997. "Economic efficiency and mixed public/private insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 505-516, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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