Is Public Health Insurance an Appropriate Instrument for Redistribution
AbstractThe shares of the public sector in health insurance provision varies enormously from country to country. It is larger in more redistributive countries. We provide a possible theoretical explanation for these facts: a public health insurance system, financed by taxes, can be an efficient means of redistribution, complementary to income taxation. This relies on the assumption of a negative correlation between income and morbidity. We examine the empirical validity of this assumption both on macro and micro data.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 98.512.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Postal: GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.
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More information through EDIRC
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ; INSURANCE ; HEALTH ; INCOME REDISTRIBUTION;
Other versions of this item:
- Dominique HENRIET & Jean-Charles ROCHET, 2006. "Is public health insurance an appropriate instrument for redistribution?," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 61-88.
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
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