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Organizations as constitutional systems

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  • Viktor Vanberg
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    Abstract

    Four theoretical approaches to the study of organizations that can be identified in the relevant literature are compared: Thegoal paradigm, theexchange paradigm, thenexus of contracts paradigm, and theconstitutional paradigm. It is argued that the latter provides the more fruitful theoretical perspective in that it reconciles an individualist methodology with an account of organisations as corporate actors, as units of collective action. Copyright George Mason University 1992

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02393121
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 3 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 223-253

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:2:p:223-253

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866

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    1. Vanberg, Viktor & Buchanan, James M, 1986. "Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-27, Fall.
    2. Klein, Benjamin, 1983. "Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 367-74, June.
    3. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February.
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    Cited by:
    1. Mudambi, Ram & Navarra, Pietro, 2002. "Institutions and internation business: a theoretical overview," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 635-646, December.
    2. Klaus Heine, 2013. "Inside the black box: incentive regulation and incentive channeling on energy markets," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 157-186, February.
    3. Anthony Evans & Nikolai Wenzel, 2013. "A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 2-18, March.
    4. Viktor Vanberg, 2014. "James Buchanan’s contractarian individualism: A personal account," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 147-156, June.

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