Organizations as constitutional systems
AbstractFour theoretical approaches to the study of organizations that can be identified in the relevant literature are compared: Thegoal paradigm, theexchange paradigm, thenexus of contracts paradigm, and theconstitutional paradigm. It is argued that the latter provides the more fruitful theoretical perspective in that it reconciles an individualist methodology with an account of organisations as corporate actors, as units of collective action. Copyright George Mason University 1992
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 3 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
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- Viktor Vanberg, 2014. "James Buchanan’s contractarian individualism: A personal account," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 147-156, June.
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