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Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”

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  • Anton Lowenberg
  • Ben Yu

Abstract

A constitution will create mutual gains for all parties only if it is negotiated within an environment in which all parties possess viable exit options. The availability of exit options can substitute for a veil of uncertainty, which is difficult to operationalize in real-world settings. An efficient constitution also will be self-enforcing if it contains rules and principles geared to support political and market competition in the post-constitutional society. Again, the notion of exit is a useful way to characterize this condition for constitutional maintenance. Copyright George Mason University 1992

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  • Anton Lowenberg & Ben Yu, 1992. "Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 51-72, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:1:p:51-72
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393232
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ludwig Van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional Economics II," Chapters, in: Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, Second Edition, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Kyriacou, Andreas, 2004. "Economic integration, legitimacy and European Union enlargement," MPRA Paper 115932, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Vanberg Viktor, 1993. "Constitutionally Constrained and Safeguarded Competition in Markets and Politics with reference to a European Constitution," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, March.
    4. Kyriacou, Andreas, 2000. "A ‘Just and Lasting Solution’ to the Cyprus Problem: In Search of Institutional Viability," MPRA Paper 116308, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. ., 2019. "Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit, chapter 1, pages 14-38, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Kyriacou, Andreas, 2001. "On the viability of potentially divided multi-ethnic states," MPRA Paper 115931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.

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