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How well capitalized are well-capitalized banks?

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  • Joe Peek
  • Eric Rosengren

Abstract

The wave of bank and savings and loan failures in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the resulting losses to deposit insurance funds, served to highlight the need for banks to hold sufficient capital to survive difficult times. In addition, many argued that deposit insurance reduces the market discipline that depositors might otherwise provide. Consequently, recent bank regulatory initiatives increasingly have emphasized the role of bank capital as a cushion to allow banks to absorb adverse shocks without experiencing insolvency.> While regulations are being designed to reward banks that are deemed to be well capitalized and restrict those that are not, no clear consensus has been reached in the academic literature on just how much capital is necessary. This article examines whether institutions satisfying the \"well-capitalized\" criteria before and during the recent banking crisis in New England had sufficient capital to weather the storm. The authors find that many of the institutions that either failed or required substantial supervisory intervention were well capitalized prior to the emergence of banking problems in New England. Problems of the magnitude recently experienced in New England would require greater capital cushions than the minimum \"well-capitalized\" prompt corrective action threshold, if widespread bank insolvencies were to be avoided.

Suggested Citation

  • Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1997. "How well capitalized are well-capitalized banks?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 41-50.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbne:y:1997:i:sep:p:41-50
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    Cited by:

    1. Pamela P. Peterson & Larry D. Wall, 1998. "The choice of capital instruments," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 83(Q 2), pages 4-17.
    2. Antoniades, Adonis, 2015. "Commercial bank failures during the Great Recession: the real (estate) story," Working Paper Series 1779, European Central Bank.
    3. Kristoffer Milonas, 2018. "Bank Taxes, Leverage, and Risk," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 145-177, October.
    4. Arturo Estrella & Sangkyun Park & Stavros Peristiani, 2000. "Capital ratios as predictors of bank failure," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul, pages 33-52.
    5. Chris Henderson & William E. Jackson & William W. Lang, 2015. "Insider bank runs: community bank fragility and the financial crisis of 2007," Working Papers 15-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. Jagtiani, Julapa & Lemieux, Catharine, 2001. "Market discipline prior to bank failure," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 313-324.
    7. Keppo, Jussi & Kofman, Leonard & Meng, Xu, 2010. "Unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2192-2214, October.
    8. Laetitia Lepetit & Amine Tarazi & Nadia Zedek, 2012. "Bank Regulatory Capital Adjustment and Ultimate Ownership Structure: Evidence from European Commercial Banks," Working Papers hal-00918577, HAL.
    9. Antonio Forte & Giovanni Pesce, 2009. "The International Financial Crisis: an Expert Survey," SERIES 0024, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Apr 2009.
    10. Clovis Rugemintwari & Alain Sauviat & Amine Tarazi, 2012. "Bâle 3 et la réhabilitation du ratio de levier des banques. Pourquoi et comment ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 63(4), pages 809-820.
    11. Dai, Min & Huang, Shan & Keppo, Jussi, 2019. "Opaque bank assets and optimal equity capital," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 369-394.
    12. Chris Brune & Kevin Lee & Scott Miller, 2015. "The effects of bank capital constraints on post-acquisition performance," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(1), pages 75-99, January.

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