Market discipline prior to bank failure
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economics and Business.
Volume (Year): 53 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2-3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeconbus
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- Yuliang Wu & Michael Bowe, 2010. "Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 159-186, December.
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- Betz, Frank & Oprica, Silviu & Peltonen, Tuomas A. & Sarlin, Peter, 2013. "Predicting distress in European banks," Working Paper Series 1597, European Central Bank.
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