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Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance

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  • Athanasios Anastasiou

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    (Department of Economics, University of Patras)

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    Abstract

    This paper examines the influence that several factors may have on the relationship between legal Central Bank Independence (CBI), on the one hand, and the inflation and real GDP growth on the other. Using multivariate regression analysis for 39 OECD during the two periods, 1991-1998 and 1999-2006, we show that even if we include several control variables in the regression, the negative relationship between CBI and inflation, and the lack of relationship between CBI and the variability of real GDP growth remaining were unaffected. Also, we decompose the index of CBI into its four components and we examine whether they matter for inflation, for real GDP growth and for the sacrifice ratio.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Cyprus, Economics Research Centre in its journal Cyprus Economic Policy Review.

    Volume (Year): 3 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 1 (June)
    Pages: 123-156

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    Handle: RePEc:erc:cypepr:v:3:y:2009:i:1:p:123-156

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    Keywords: Central bank independence; inflation; real output growth; ordinary least squares estimation;

    References

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    1. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
    2. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1996. "Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?," NBER Working Papers 5540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Giuseppe Diana & Moise Sidiropoulos, 2003. "Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio," Working Papers of BETA 2003-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    4. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
    5. Thomas Jordan, 1997. "Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank independence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 1-21, March.
    6. Kees Bouwman & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "On the relationship between central bank independence and inflation: some more bad news," Applied Financial Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 1(6), pages 381-385, November.
    7. Brumm, Harold J, 2000. "Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Conventional Wisdom Redux," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 807-19, November.
    8. Eijffinger, S. & van Rool, M. & Schaling, E., 1994. "Central Bank Independence: A Panel Data Approach," Papers 9493, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    9. Hall, Peter A. & Franzese, Robert J., 1998. "Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(03), pages 505-535, June.
    10. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 14033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 72, Netherlands Central Bank.
    12. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
    13. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
    14. Adam Posen, 1995. "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?," Staff Reports 1, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    15. David Romer, 1991. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1992. "Central bank independence: Criteria and indices," Research Memorandum 548, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    17. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
    18. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
    19. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
    20. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1998. "Independently Blue? Accountability and Independence in the New European Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 1842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
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    Cited by:
    1. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2013. "The influence of political factors on commercial banks in Central European countries," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 759-777.
    2. Efthyvoulou, Georgios, 2011. "Political cycles under external economic constraints: Evidence from Cyprus," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 638-662.
    3. Allan Silveira Dos Santos & Maria Helena Ambrosio Dias & Joilson Dias & Érica Oliveira Gonzales, 2014. "Monetary Programming, Turnover Of The Directors Of Central Bank And Interest Rate Determination: Reaction Function Applications For Brazil," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 052, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].

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