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Inflation Targeting and Sacrifice Ratios : The Case of the European Central Bank

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  • SERGIO ROSSI
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    Article provided by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. in its journal International Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 34 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 69-85

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    Handle: RePEc:mes:ijpoec:v:34:y:2004:i:2:p:69-85

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-59, July.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
    3. Berg, Claes & Jonung, Lars, 1998. "Pioneering Price Level Targeting: The Swedish Experience 1931-1937," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies 642, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    4. Giuseppe Diana & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2004. "Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 385-402, October.
    5. Laurence Ball, 1994. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Jordan, Thomas J., 1999. "Central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 229-255, June.
    7. Svensson, Lars E O, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
    9. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Countries," NBER Working Papers 7618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Peter B. Kenen & Ellen E. Meade, 2003. "EU Accession and the Euro: Close Together or Far Apart?," Policy Briefs PB03-09, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    11. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
    12. Temple, Jonathan, 2002. "Openness, Inflation, and the Phillips Curve: A Puzzle," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 450-68, May.
    13. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    14. Cecchetti, Stephen G, 2000. "Making Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 43-59, Winter.
    15. Okun, Arthur M, 1978. "Efficient Disinflationary Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 348-52, May.
    16. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
    18. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
    19. Laurence Ball & N. Gregory Mankiw & David Romer, 1988. "The New Keynsesian Economics and the Output-Inflation Trade-off," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 1-82.
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