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Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s “Rule of Mandates”

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  • Birney, Mayling

Abstract

This paper shows why corruption is especially difficult to detect under China’s system of decentralized authoritarian rule, which I call a “rule of mandates.” Local officials must pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement. A relative standard for corruption consequently arises since non-implementation of laws may be mandate-serving or may be corrupt; and determining which requires extra information on why non-implementation occurred. The theory is supported by evidence from original survey and case research on the implementation of the village elections law. I discuss implications for anticorruption efforts, development patterns, and future research.

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  • Birney, Mayling, 2014. "Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s “Rule of Mandates”," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 55-67.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:53:y:2014:i:c:p:55-67
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.006
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