The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections

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The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections

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Loren Brandt
Matthew Turner

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Abstract

Using a sample of rural Chines villages which have recently been the subject of democratic reforms we look for the relationship between marginal changes in the democratic process and marginal changes in economic outcomes. We find that even very poorly conducted elections can have large incentive effects. That is, even corruptible elections provide leaders with strong incentives to act in the interests of their constituents. Our findings also allow us to rank the imiprotance of four possible election reforms which have attracted the attention of international observers and academic researchers.

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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-233.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 26 May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-233

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Paper
- Loren Brandt & Matthew Turner, 2003. "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-602, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
- Loren Brandt & Matthew A. Turner, 2003. "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections," Working Papers brandt-03-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H0 - Public Economics - - General
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition," NBER Working Papers 4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
Other versions:
- Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Besley, Timothy J. & Case, Anne, 2002. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 3498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Loren Brandt & Scott Rozelle & Matthew A. Turner, 2002. "Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China," Working Papers mturner-02-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Loren Brandt & Scott Rozelle & Matthew Turner, 2002. "Local Government Behavior and Property Rights Formation in Rural China," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Davis, Working Paper Series 1004, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Davis. [Downloadable!]
- Loren Brandt & Scott Rozelle & Matthew A. Turner, 2004. "Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 127(4), pages 627-, December.
Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems?," Working Papers 232, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]

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