Elections, fiscal reform and public goods provision in rural China
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.
Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864
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