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The moral hazard of Lax FCC land use oversight for advanced network infrastructure

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  • Cramer, Benjamin W.

Abstract

This article discusses issues that arise when service providers place network equipment on publicly owned lands in the United States. Based on land use policy at the Federal Communications Commission, this paper theorizes that the use of public lands for 5G network development will create a moral hazard, as service providers may be tempted to take risks in the way they use public lands. Per economic theory the firm could behave recklessly when knowing that the costs will be borne by someone else – in this case local citizens. This is an example of the moral hazard problem in economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Cramer, Benjamin W., 2022. "The moral hazard of Lax FCC land use oversight for advanced network infrastructure," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:46:y:2022:i:1:s0308596121001361
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2021.102232
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1995. "Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 319-336, November.
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    5. Avner,Paolo & Hallegatte,Stephane, 2019. "Moral Hazard vs. Land Scarcity : Flood Management Policies for the Real World," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9012, The World Bank.
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    11. Cramer, Benjamin W., 2016. "Right way wrong way: The fading legal justifications for telecommunications infrastructure rights-of-way," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 996-1006.
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