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Examination incentives, learning, and patent office outcomes: The use of examiner’s amendments at the USPTO

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  • deGrazia, Charles A.W.
  • Pairolero, Nicholas A.
  • Teodorescu, Mike H.M.

Abstract

We investigate how U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent examiner experience and seniority-based incentives affect the innovation ecosystem. First, we show that examiners respond to production incentives and demonstrate learning by increasing the use of examiner’s amendments in both experience and seniority, a mechanism not previously studied. Second, this examination procedure directly benefits innovators and firms by significantly reducing prosecution processing time without impacting patent quality. Finally, after considering examiner’s amendments, the negative relationship between examiner characteristics and patent examination quality found in the previous literature does not persist at first action, a decision point that allows for the clear measurement of examiner behavior. Our results demonstrate a need for reformulated policy recommendations related to the structure of examination at the USPTO.

Suggested Citation

  • deGrazia, Charles A.W. & Pairolero, Nicholas A. & Teodorescu, Mike H.M., 2021. "Examination incentives, learning, and patent office outcomes: The use of examiner’s amendments at the USPTO," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(10).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:50:y:2021:i:10:s0048733321001578
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2021.104360
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent examiner incentives; Patent examiner experience; Patent pendency; Patent quality; Patent office policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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