Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants
Abstract
We examine the strategic non-revelation of information by patent applicants. In a model of a bilateral search of information, we show that patent applicants may conceal information, and that examiners make their screening intensity contingent upon the received information. We then analyze the effects of a double review policy and a policy in which examiners ex ante commit to screening efforts. The implementation of the former policy reduces strategic non-revelation, but its overall implication remains unclear. The latter policy involves equal screening intensity across all applications, requires a limited commitment power and induces truthful revelation.Download Info
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Paper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-21.Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 30 May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:albaec:2009_021
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Related research
Keywords: patents; information; incentives;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-06-17 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-INO-2009-06-17 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-06-17 (Intellectual Property Rights)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roland Strausz, .
"Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing,"
Papers
015, Departmental Working Papers.
- Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 89-107, January.
- Strausz, Roland, 2005. "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 33, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Stuart J. H. Graham & Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff & David C. Mowery, 2003.
"Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions,"
Industrial Organization
0303009, EconWPA.
- Graham, Stuart J. H. & Hall, Bronwyn H. & Harhoff, Dietmar & Mowery, David C., 2002. "Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8bs830w9, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Graham, Stuart J. H. & Hall, Bronwyn H. & Harhoff, Dietmar & Mowery, David C., 2002. "Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-Examinations and European Patent Oppositions," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2qt097bd, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Stuart J. H. Graham & Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff & David C. Mowery, 2002. "Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions," NBER Working Papers 8807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
- Jonathan Coppel, 2000. "E-Commerce: Impacts and Policy Challenges," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 252, OECD Publishing.
Citations
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- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00740716 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00575019 is not listed on IDEAS
- Schuett, F., 2012. "Inventors and Imposters: An Analysis of Patent Examination with Self-Selection of Firms into R&D," Discussion Paper 2012-026, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- David Encaoua & Thierry Madiès, 2012. "Dysfunctions of the patent system and their effects on competition," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00740716, HAL.
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