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On the grant rate of Patent Cooperation Treaty applications: Theory and evidence

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  • Zhao, Long

Abstract

Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) has become increasingly important for patent applications across countries. However, our understanding of how PCT works remains limited in the literature. This paper investigates the role of PCT in the grant rate theoretically and empirically. I show that the first-stage report from PCT applications can complement national phase examinations in a theoretical model. Thus, it is in a patent office’s interest to set a higher grant rate to PCT than direct patent applications. Next, using patent-level data from the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) during 2000–2008, I empirically verify that CIPO is more likely to grant patents to PCT than direct applications and foreign applicants are more likely to file PCT applications. This paper suggests that PCT applications have a high grant rate and a higher quality, which partly explains the increasing popularity of PCT.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhao, Long, 2022. "On the grant rate of Patent Cooperation Treaty applications: Theory and evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:117:y:2022:i:c:s0264999322002887
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106051
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    Cited by:

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    2. Li Yao & He Ni, 2023. "Prediction of patent grant and interpreting the key determinants: an application of interpretable machine learning approach," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 128(9), pages 4933-4969, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent Cooperation Treaty; Direct applications; Grant rate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O51 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - U.S.; Canada

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