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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 641-661
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:winter:p:641-661

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