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Collective contests for commons and club goods

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  • Nitzan, Shmuel
  • Ueda, Kaoru

Abstract

This paper focuses on collective contests for commons and club goods. Our main objective is to examine in this context the effect of group size on its performance. The main results specify conditions for the existence (non-existence) of the group-size paradox, namely, the situation where a larger group is less (more) effective in pursuing its interest because of (despite) the combined effect of the incentives that result in the free-riding problem and the tragedy of the commons. The paper also explains under what circumstances there exists a bias towards excessive or inadequate winning group size. Finally, it examines the effect of restricted excludability of the commons good within the winning group on the relationship between group-size and its winning probability.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 93 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (February)
Pages: 48-55

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:1-2:p:48-55

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

Related research

Keywords: Collective contest Commons and club good prize The group-size paradox Excessive or inadequate winning group size;

References

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  1. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
  2. Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2003. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2003/05, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  3. Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
  4. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
  5. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu & Na, Sunghyun, 2001. "Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 415-429, December.
  6. Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Bidding in hierarchies," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-27, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  7. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1983. "On Commons and Tragedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 787-92, September.
  8. Kyung Hwan Baik, 1994. "Winner-Help-Loser Group Formation In Rent-Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 147-162, 07.
  9. Stevenson,Glenn G., 1991. "Common Property Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521384414, April.
  10. Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
  11. Hoel, Alf Håkon & Kvalvik, Ingrid, 2006. "The allocation of scarce natural resources: The case of fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 347-356, July.
  12. Kaoru Ueda, 2002. "Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 613-626.
  13. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2001. "Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 672-84, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2010. "Inefficient Group Organization as Optimal Adaption to Dominant Environments," CESifo Working Paper Series 3157, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2014. "Cost Sharing in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4825, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Kolmar, Martin & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2013. "Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 9-22.
  4. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2011. "Technological Determinants of the Group-Size Paradox," CESifo Working Paper Series 3362, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2010. "Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3136, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests," Working Papers 2010-18, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
  7. Jingjing Zhang, 2012. "Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods," ECON - Working Papers 069, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  8. Kolmar, Martin, 2013. "Group Conflicts. Where do we stand?," Economics Working Paper Series 1331, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  9. Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2010. "Prize Sharing in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3212, CESifo Group Munich.

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