Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kaoru Ueda

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Nanzan University, 18 Yamazato-cho Showa-ku, Nagoya, Aichi 466-8673, Japan)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    In this paper we discuss the issue of when oligopolization in collective rent-seeking occurs, that is, when some groups retire from rent-seeking. A complete characterization of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a collective rent-seeking game among m (\geq2) heterogeneous groups is derived. The conditions of oligopolization are derived by using this result and related to the works of Nitzan [9, 10] and Hillman and Riley [3]. Also, the subgame perfect equilibrium of a simple two-stage collective rent-seeking game (Lee [7]) is fully characterized. In this game, it is confirmed that no group retires from the contest in the second stage and oligopolization never occurs. An example of the two-stage collective rent-seeking game with monitoring costs is devised to show the possibilities of oligopolization.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/2019003/20190613.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 613-626

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:613-626

    Note: Received: 21 September 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2001 received very helpful comments from Debraj Ray. All remaining errors are my responsibility.-->
    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

    Order Information:
    Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2010. "Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests," IZA Discussion Papers 5158, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2014. "Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 219-238, June.
    3. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    4. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2014. "Difference-form group contests," Working Papers 2014/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    5. Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2010. "Prize Sharing in Collective Contests," Working Papers 2010-08, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
    6. Nitzan, Shmuel & Ueda, Kaoru, 2009. "Collective contests for commons and club goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 48-55, February.
    7. Francis Bloch, 2009. "Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts," Working Papers hal-00435387, HAL.
    8. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    9. Heinrich Ursprung, 2011. "The Evolution of Sharing Rules in Rent Seeking Contests: Incentives Crowd Out Cooperation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-02, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    10. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Lee, Sanghack & Lee, Shi Young, 2006. "The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 337-342, June.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:613-626. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.