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‘Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants

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  • Foremny, Dirk
  • Jofre-Monseny, Jordi
  • Solé-Ollé, Albert

Abstract

This paper analyzes how local governments misreport population figures to obtain higher per capita grant allocations. In 1998, the allocation of a formula based grant in Spain switched from using the centrally administered census to local population registers administered by municipalities. The value of this per capita grant changes at fixed population thresholds for the entire local population. We exploit these notches to analyze the size distribution of municipalities to detect deliberate manipulation of the grant-assignment variable. This allows us to causally identify the effect of grant generosity on population over-reporting. We document an excess mass of municipalities to the right of the notch threshold and a density hole to the left of it: local registers included a proportion of ‘ghost citizens', that is, people who presented no trace of actually residing in the municipalities which benefit the most from inflating population figures to pass the relevant threshold. We document that manipulation (rather than real population responses) is the mechanism at work. The main channel behind manipulation is the incorrect treatment of foreign residents to inflate total local population.

Suggested Citation

  • Foremny, Dirk & Jofre-Monseny, Jordi & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 2017. "‘Ghost citizens': Using notches to identify manipulation of population-based grants," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 49-66.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:49-66
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.011
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    2. Sanchez-Vidal, Maria, 2019. "Retail shocks and city structure," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 103394, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Felipe Carozzi & Davide Cipullo & Luca Repetto, 2019. "Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability," Working Papers wp2019_1911, CEMFI.
    4. Palguta, Ján & Pertold, Filip, 2021. "Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1020-1047.
    5. Israel García & Bernd Hayo, 2023. "Fiscal Reform in Spanish Municipalities: Gender Differences in Budgetary Adjustment," CESifo Working Paper Series 10297, CESifo.
    6. David R. Agrawal & Dirk Foremny, 2019. "Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 214-232, May.
    7. Maria Sánchez-Vidal, 2019. "Retail shocks and city structure," CEP Discussion Papers dp1636, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    8. Felipe Carozzi & Davide Cipullo & Luca Repetto, 2022. "Political Fragmentation and Government Stability: Evidence from Local Governments in Spain," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 23-50, April.
    9. De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny & Schönhage, Nanna Lauritz, 2018. "Strategic public policy around population thresholds," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 46-58.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intergovernmental transfers; Notches; Bunching; Enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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