IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pacfin/v29y2014icp272-296.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The association between related-party transactions and control–ownership wedge: Evidence from Korea

Author

Listed:
  • Kang, Minjung
  • Lee, Ho-Young
  • Lee, Myung-Gun
  • Park, Jong Chool

Abstract

In this study, we examine whether related party transactions (RPT) are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms belonging to large business groups in Korea (chaebols). Using 982 firm-year data of publicly traded firms in Korea, we find that the control–ownership wedge is positively associated with the magnitude of RPTs. RPTs increase as voting rights increase, while RPTs decrease as cash flow rights increase. The control–ownership wedge is more closely related to RPTs among the top 5 chaebol firms where the agency conflicts between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders are more severe than in non-top 5 chaebol firms. While the significant positive association between the control–ownership wedge and RPTs holds for both operating and non-operating RPTs, we find that non-top 5 chaebols use only non-operating RPTs whereas the top 5 firms use both operating and non-operating RPTs. Finally, we find that RPTs of Korean chaebol firms, on average, reduce firm value, but this value destruction is observed only when the control–ownership wedge is high and is more pronounced with the top 5 chaebol firms. Overall, our results together suggest that RPTs occur when the agency problem is severe and they are used as a means of tunneling, thus destroying firm value.

Suggested Citation

  • Kang, Minjung & Lee, Ho-Young & Lee, Myung-Gun & Park, Jong Chool, 2014. "The association between related-party transactions and control–ownership wedge: Evidence from Korea," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 272-296.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:29:y:2014:i:c:p:272-296
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.04.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X14000535
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.04.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Johnson, 2000. "Tunneling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 22-27, May.
    2. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    3. Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. Lins, 2003. "Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1445-1468, August.
    4. Stein, Jeremy C, 1997. "Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 111-133, March.
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    6. Paul A. Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2010. "Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(3), pages 1051-1088, March.
    7. Harvey, Campbell R. & Lins, Karl V. & Roper, Andrew H., 2004. "The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 3-30, October.
    8. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    9. Shin, Hyun-Han & Park, Young S., 1999. "Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean 'chaebols'," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 169-191, June.
    10. Chan, Su Han & Martin, John D. & Kensinger, John W., 1990. "Corporate research and development expenditures and share value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 255-276, August.
    11. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    12. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    13. Lins, Karl V., 2003. "Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 159-184, March.
    14. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, June.
    15. Campbell, Terry II & Keys, Phyllis Y., 2002. "Corporate governance in South Korea: the chaebol experience," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 373-391, October.
    16. Claessens, Stijn & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Lang, Larry H.P., 2006. "The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, March.
    17. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Stouraitis, Aris, 2006. "Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 343-386, November.
    18. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    19. Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Propping and tunneling," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 732-750, December.
    20. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    21. Jeong†Bon Kim & Cheong H. Yi, 2006. "Ownership Structure, Business Group Affiliation, Listing Status, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(2), pages 427-464, June.
    22. Almeida, Heitor & Park, Sang Yong & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2011. "The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 447-475, February.
    23. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Qi, Yuehua & Raghavendra Rau, P. & Stouraitis, Aris, 2009. "Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 914-924, May.
    24. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    25. Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus the Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899.
    26. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    27. Marianne Bertrand & Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2002. "Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 121-148.
    28. Wolfgang Drobetz & Andreas Schillhofer & Heinz Zimmermann, 2004. "Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(2), pages 267-293, June.
    29. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    30. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    31. Jung, Kooyul & Kwon, Soo Young, 2002. "Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 301-325.
    32. Kohlbeck, Mark & Mayhew, Brian W., 2010. "Valuation of firms that disclose related party transactions," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 115-137, March.
    33. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    34. Joseph P. H. Fan & T. J. Wong, 2005. "Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 35-72, March.
    35. DeFond, Mark L. & Jiambalvo, James, 1994. "Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 145-176, January.
    36. Kim, Woochan & Lim, Youngjae & Sung, Taeyoon, 2007. "Group control motive as a determinant of ownership structure in business conglomerates: Evidence from Korea's chaebols," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 213-252, June.
    37. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    38. Kee‐Hong Bae & Jun‐Koo Kang & Jin‐Mo Kim, 2002. "Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2695-2740, December.
    39. Baek, Jae-Seung & Kang, Jun-Koo & Suh Park, Kyung, 2004. "Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 265-313, February.
    40. Bernard S. Black & Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, 2006. "Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 366-413, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Oded Cohen, 2020. "Firm-level and Country-level Corporate Governance: Does One Substitute or Complement the Other?," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2020.08, Bank of Israel.
    2. Lioara-Veronica Pasc & Camelia-Daniela Hațegan, 2020. "Related Parties’ Transactions: A Literature Overview on Auditor’s Risk," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(2), pages 1021-1030, December.
    3. Bansal, Shashank & Thenmozhi, M., 2020. "Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    4. Cho, Meeok & Kim, Sehee & Kim, Yewon & Lee, Bryan Byung-Hee & Lee, Woo-Jong, 2021. "IFRS adoption and stock misvaluation: Implication to Korea discount," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    5. Sungbin Cho & Kyung†Mook Lim, 2018. "Tunneling by Related†party Transactions: Evidence from Korean Conglomerates," Asian Economic Journal, East Asian Economic Association, vol. 32(2), pages 147-164, June.
    6. Bansal, Shashank & Singh, Harminder, 2023. "Does market competition foster related party transactions? Evidence from emerging market," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    7. Ilhang Shin & Sorah Park & Seong Pyo Cho & Seungho Choi, 2020. "The effect of labor unions on innovation and market valuation in business group affiliations: new evidence from South Korea," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(2), pages 239-270, April.
    8. Aldy Fariz Achsanta & Tastaftiyan Risfandy & Putra Pamungkas & Irwan Trinugroho & Herman Saheruddin, 2021. "Related bank deposits: Good or bad for stability?," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 11(4), pages 735-751, December.
    9. Andrikopoulos, Andreas & Merika, Anna & Merikas, Andreas & Sigalas, Christos, 2021. "Related party transactions and principal-principal conflicts in public companies: Evidence from the maritime shipping industry," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    10. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2020. "Related Party Transactions, State Ownership, the Cost of Corporate Debt, and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Vietnam," OSF Preprints y5qj3, Center for Open Science.
    11. Chung, Heesun & Choi, Sunhwa & Jung, Woon-Oh, 2019. "Controlling shareholders' tax incentives and related party transactions," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    12. Hyunjung Choi & Jungeun Cho, 2021. "Related-Party Transactions, Chaebol Affiliations, and the Value of Cash Holdings," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-13, January.
    13. Yeh, Yin-Hua, 2019. "Corporate governance and family succession: New evidence from Taiwan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    14. Guang-Zheng Chen, 2020. "Related Party Transactions and Opinion Shopping," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 10(1), pages 1-9.
    15. Maigoshi, Zaharaddeen Salisu & Latif, Rohaida Abdul & Kamardin, Hasnah, 2018. "Change in value-relevance of disclosed RPT across accounting regimes: Evidence from Malaysia," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 422-433.
    16. Kinshuk Saurabh, 2023. "Expropriation mechanisms, corporate governance, and cross-border acquisitions by Indian firms," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(4), pages 395-409, December.
    17. Haeyoung Ryu & Soo-Joon Chae, 2022. "Relationship between Related Party Transactions and the Social Contribution Activities of South Korean Chaebol Companies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(5), pages 1-11, February.
    18. Abdul Rasheed P C & T. Mallikarjunappa & K.T. Thomachan, 2019. "Promoter Ownership, Related Party Transactions and Firm Performance: A Study Among Selected Companies in India," FIIB Business Review, , vol. 8(3), pages 205-217, September.
    19. Won-Yong Oh & Hojae Ree & Young Kyun Chang & Igor Postuła, 2023. "Trees in the Forest: How Do Family Owners Make CSR Decisions in Business Groups?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 187(4), pages 759-780, November.
    20. Utku ŞENDURUR & Bekir GEREKAN, 2023. "Related Parties Transactions and Firm Value: Intermediate Effect of Sustainability Performance," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 31(56).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195.
    2. Bansal, Shashank & Thenmozhi, M., 2020. "Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    3. Bernard Yeung & Randall Morck & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth," Working Papers 04-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    4. Connelly, J. Thomas & Limpaphayom, Piman & Nagarajan, Nandu J., 2012. "Form versus substance: The effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm value in Thailand," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1722-1743.
    5. Pier Luigi Marchini & Tatiana Mazza & Alice Medioli, 2018. "The impact of related party transactions on earnings management: some insights from the Italian context," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(4), pages 981-1014, December.
    6. Hsu, Audrey Wen-hsin & Liu, Sophia Hsin-Tsai, 2016. "Organizational structure, agency costs, and accrual quality," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 35-60.
    7. Minjung Kang & Sangil Kim & Moon-Kyung Cho, 2019. "The Effect of R&D and the Control–Ownership Wedge on Firm Value: Evidence from Korean Chaebol Firms," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-20, May.
    8. Richardson, Grant & Wang, Bei & Zhang, Xinmin, 2016. "Ownership structure and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from publicly listed private firms in China," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 141-158.
    9. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "‘Family’ Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, September.
    10. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Qi, Yuehua & Raghavendra Rau, P. & Stouraitis, Aris, 2009. "Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 914-924, May.
    11. Joseph P. H. Fan & Li Jin & Guojian Zheng, 2016. "Revisiting the Bright and Dark Sides of Capital Flows in Business Groups," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 509-528, April.
    12. Byun, Hae-Young & Choi, Sunhwa & Hwang, Lee-Seok & Kim, Robert G., 2013. "Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 311-331.
    13. Feng, Xunan & Hu, Na & Johansson, Anders C., 2016. "Ownership, analyst coverage, and stock synchronicity in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 79-96.
    14. Lee, Shih-Cheng & Lin, Chien-Ting, 2010. "An accounting-based valuation approach to valuing corporate governance in Taiwan," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 47-60.
    15. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
    16. Zeineb Barka & Taher Hamza, 2020. "The effect of large controlling shareholders on equity prices in France: monitoring or entrenchment?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 769-798, September.
    17. Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, 2010. "The Value of Principles-Based Governance Practices and the Attenuation of Information Asymmetry," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 17(2), pages 171-207, June.
    18. Pursey Heugens & Marc Essen & J. Oosterhout, 2009. "Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 481-512, September.
    19. Sviatoslav Moskalev & Seung Park, 2010. "South Korean Chaebols and Value-Based Management," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 49-62, March.
    20. Juan Manuel San Martín Reyna, 2012. "An Empirical Examination of Ownership Structure, Earnings Management and Growth Opportunities in Mexican Market," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 2(7), pages 103-123, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Related-party transactions; Control–ownership wedge; Control rights; Cash flow rights; Chaebol firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:29:y:2014:i:c:p:272-296. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/pacfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.